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Abstract: Many have argued that the human sciences feature a unique form of 
understanding (Verstehen) that is absent from the natural sciences. However, in the 
last decade or so, epistemologists and philosophers of natural science have been 
proffering analyses of a kind of natural-scientific understanding. Using examples 
from educational psychology and anthropology, I argue that there are prima facie 
reasons to think these recent accounts of natural-scientific understanding impose 
necessary conditions on Verstehen. This suggests that any claim about Verstehen’s 
distinctiveness faces hitherto-unappreciated burdens of proof. 
 
Keywords: understanding, Verstehen, explanation, interpretation, naturalism 
1. Introduction 
In the philosophy of social science, understanding (Verstehen) involves the grasping 
of meaningful behavior, psychological states, practices, and cultural artifacts. 
Historically, hermeneuticists took Verstehen to distinguish the social from the 
natural sciences, while positivists demurred. While the arguments have matured 
over the years, the dialectical space has retained much of its 19th century topology, 
with “interpretivists” (Stueber 2006) and “naturalists” (Roth 2003) taking over the 
respective roles of hermeneuticists and positivists. 
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Traditionally, when philosophers of social science have debated about 
Verstehen, only interpretivists lay claim to a concept of understanding. However, 
current work in epistemology and the philosophy of natural science challenges this 
framework by offering more general concepts of understanding, intended to 
encompass both the human and natural sciences. These developments shift the 
terms of the debate. No longer is the question whether the human sciences alone 
aim at understanding. Rather, the question is whether and to what extent the 
human and natural sciences aim at the same kind of understanding.  
Using the account of natural-scientific understanding from my book, 
Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge (Khalifa 2017), I shall argue 
that the burden of proof hangs on interpretivists’ shoulders, for understanding in 
the human sciences appears to have much in common with its natural-scientific 
cousin. I shall present my case as follows. Section 2 motivates infusing the debate 
between interpretivists and naturalists with the new literature on understanding. 
Section 3 presents my account of natural-scientific understanding, and extends it to 
a case of social-scientific understanding from educational psychology. Section 4 then 
extends it to an example from cultural anthropology. Given its application to these 
rather disparate examples, I suggest that we have some preliminary evidence in 
favor of naturalism. Section 5 then rehearses how interpretivists might reply to this 
challenge, and shows that they face substantial tasks going forward. 
Before proceeding, I offer a caveat. In this paper, I shall only argue that all of 
the norms governing understanding in the natural sciences also apply to 
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understanding in the human sciences. I will not broach the important question of 
whether the only norms governing understanding in the human sciences are those 
of the natural sciences. I hope to address this in future work. Furthermore, the 
reasons offered for naturalism are not intended to be conclusive. Rather, they are 
offered more in the spirit of reorienting the dialectical burdens concerning the 
distinctiveness of understanding in the human sciences. 
2. The Verstehen Wars 
Many have debated whether certain social sciences (hereafter, “the human 
sciences”) feature a kind of understanding that is distinct from anything found in 
the natural sciences. For ease of reference, let’s introduce some terminology. First, 
denote this allegedly distinctive form of understanding with the German 
“Verstehen.” Typically, Verstehen is characterized as some kind of accurate 
simulation of another’s mental states and processes, and human-scientific 
accounts—most notably intentional-action explanations—improve in proportion to 
the Verstehen they recruit, enable, or provide. Next, let’s denote the kind of 
understanding common to all of the natural sciences with the phrase “scientific 
understanding.” Furthermore, let “understanding” be the genus that includes both 
Verstehen and scientific understanding. Finally, for added flourish, let’s call the 
debate as to whether Verstehen is distinct from scientific understanding “the 
Verstehen Wars.” Those who claim that Verstehen is distinctive shall be called 
“interpretivists;” those who deny this, “naturalists.” 
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Earlier Verstehen Wars assumed that the only kind of understanding was 
Verstehen. Thus, interpretivists claimed that only the human sciences featured 
understanding, while naturalists claimed that understanding was no part of any 
science—human or otherwise. However, this may not be the most profitable way of 
carving up the landscape. Natural scientists have long claimed that understanding 
is one of their aims. For instance, Schrödinger (1954, 90) writes: 
What are the peculiar, special traits of our scientific world-picture? About one 
of these fundamental features there can be no doubt. It is the hypothesis that 
the display of Nature can be understood. 
Similarly and more recently, Nobel-winning astronomer Robert Kirshner (1994, 65) 
writes: 
Understanding the history of matter and searching for its most interesting 
forms, such as galaxies, stars, planets and life, seems a suitable use for our 
intelligence. 
Parallel developments in recent epistemology and philosophy of natural science also 
suggest that purveyors of Verstehen have no monopoly on the term “understanding.” 
Here, the main questions are whether understanding is a species of knowledge, 
whether it traffics exclusively in truth, what kinds of cognitive abilities it requires, 
and even whether it requires explanation.1 Similarly, in the philosophy of the 
natural sciences, accounts of understanding have shed new light on idealization, 
modeling, realism, explanation, representation, and the aims of scientific inquiry.  
 
1 For a useful review, see Baumberger, Beisbart, and Brun (2016). 
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Importantly, none of these positions makes any exception when human 
affairs are the objects of understanding. To be sure, some contributors to this 
burgeoning literature argue that understanding possesses a distinctive epistemic 
value that other epistemic standings (such as knowledge) lack (Kvanvig 2003, 
Pritchard 2010). However, even they make no special allowance for the human 
sciences. In other words, whatever distinctive epistemic value understanding has, it 
is understanding that applies just as much to the phenomena studied by physics as 
the phenomena studied by history or anthropology. 
Against this backdrop, the older battle lines of the Verstehen Wars should be 
redrawn. No longer should we be asking, “Does a methodologically sound human 
science feature Verstehen?” Rather, we should be asking, “What, if anything, 
distinguishes Verstehen from scientific understanding?” On this new way of carving 
things up, interpretivists claim that something can fund this distinction; naturalists 
disagree. As mentioned above, I will offer only a partial and preliminary argument 
for naturalism, in that I will argue that Verstehen is a species of scientific 
understanding. This is partial because I will say very little about how Verstehen 
differs from other kinds of scientific understanding. It is provisional in that my 
arguments are based on just two examples of understanding in the social sciences, 
as well as some more general philosophical reflections. Additional examples could 
certainly falsify these claims. 
These qualifications notwithstanding, I hope to shed some new light on the 
Verstehen Wars. First, if the arguments here are sound, then interpretivists will 
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have a narrower but better-circumscribed problem space than before, for I will have 
shown that scientific understanding imposes necessary conditions on Verstehen. 
Thus, interpretivists will have to show that scientific understanding does not also 
impose sufficient conditions on Verstehen, or else the game is up. Second, my 
account of scientific understanding is formulated fairly precisely and lends itself to 
being evaluated by concrete examples from different sciences. In my estimate, 
earlier iterations of the Verstehen Wars have been sparse along both of these 
dimensions. Thus, I hope that my partial and provisional answer in favor of 
naturalism is nevertheless illuminating. 
3. The EKS Model 
I shall now present my account of understanding, which I call the Explanation-
Knowledge-Science (EKS) Model.2 It has been applied, with varying degrees of 
detail, to numerous examples from physics (quantum mechanics, Galilean 
dynamics, statistical mechanics), ecology, and biomedical research. I now extend it 
to the social sciences. In this section, I examine how it fares with an example from 
educational psychology. In the next section, I look at ethnography. 
I begin with a phenomenon that I suspect is familiar to many a reader. In the 
course of teaching, we frequently encounter students who are struggling with the 
material, yet, curiously, they seem the most reticent to come to office hours, seek 
tutoring, etc. What could explain this self-defeating behavior, and how might 
educators counteract it? In a widely cited study, Ryan, Gheen, and Midgley (1998) 
 
2 Please pronounce this as if it were the X-Model. 
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studied 516 sixth-graders in 62 math classrooms to examine the effect of classroom’s 
goal structure and social climate on this phenomenon of “help avoidance.”  
Using five-point scales, students were asked to assess the extent to which 
different statements were true of them. These scores were used as measures for the 
following four variables: 
• Their proclivity to avoid seeking help. 
• Their estimates of their ability to complete work or their “self-efficacy.”  
• Their perception of whether students in their class are largely rewarded for 
effort (a “task-based goal structure”) or for being better than their peers (an 
“ability-based goal structure”). 
• Their perception of whether their teachers were providing social-emotional 
support in addition to academic support.  
After running a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analysis on their data, Ryan et 
al. found that high self-efficacy and being male significantly increased help 
avoidance, while students’ perceptions of the classroom as having a task-based 
(rather than ability-based) goal structure and an emotionally supportive teacher 
significantly decreased help avoidance. From this, they explain students’ help 
avoidance as a confluence of these interacting factors. 
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Let’s assume that Ryan et al. have some understanding of why students 
sometimes avoid seeking help.3 How are we to unpack this? Enter my EKS Model. 
Its core ideas are threefold:4 
MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING: Minimal understanding of why p is having an 
approximately true belief in an explanation of p. 
THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE: Understanding of why p improves in proportion to the 
amount of explanatory information about p that is grasped, i.e. to the degree 
to which p’s “explanatory nexus” which is grasped. 
THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE: Understanding of why p improves in 
proportion to the resemblance of this grasp to scientific knowledge of why p. 
The latter two claims highlight an oft-undertheorized point in the understanding 
literature: understanding admits of degrees. Thus, we can see any particular 
instance of understanding as requiring belief in one or more approximately true 
explanations of the same phenomenon, plus some further resemblance to scientific 
knowledge. Like other kinds of resemblance, what counts as similar enough is a 
matter of context. 
 
3 In this example and the next, I assume that the social scientists have succeeded in 
understanding the phenomena of interest. Should this assumption turn out to be 
false, then it suffices for my purposes if the social scientists sought understanding of 
these phenomena. In either case, the norms of understanding would remain the 
same; the only difference would be whether the social scientists lived up to those 
norms. 
4 Khalifa (2017) presents these ideas more precisely. I have opted for a breezier 
exposition here. 
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This raises two key questions. First, what is an explanation? The EKS Model 
adopts a thin account of explanation, which holds that q explains why p if and only 
if:  
(1) p is (approximately) true; 
(2) q satisfies your favorite (but reasonable) ontological requirements; 
(3) q makes a difference to p; and  
(4) q satisfies the relevant local constraints. 
Consider, for instance, that a lower sense of self-efficacy explains why some 
students are reluctant to seek help. The first condition is uncontroversial: if no 
students were reluctant to seek help, there would be nothing to explain. The second 
condition is designed to circumvent the scientific realism debate. If you’re an 
antirealist, then presumably you will only require your explanans to be utile, 
empirically adequate, etc. If you’re a realist, you’ll demand greater fidelity to the 
world. In our example, different psychologists might well have differing stances 
toward the ontological status of students’ sense of self-efficacy. Some may think it 
refers to a robust psychological motivation, others to a useful operational definition, 
etc. The EKS Model’s second condition on explanation is designed to be 
accommodating on this front. 
The third requirement on explanation echoes a widespread idea in the 
explanation literature, namely that explanations ought to tell us what would 
happen to the explanandum if the explanans were different (Woodward 2003). 
Given the statistical methods used, there is no doubt that this is in play here, for 
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the claim (at root) is that students’ sense of self-efficacy makes a statistically 
significant difference to their proclivity toward help avoidance. Finally, as a 
scientific pluralist, I’d like to leave room for a variety of different kinds of 
explanations. My fourth, local constraint does just this. In this particular case, Ryan 
et al. focus on some the causes of help avoidance that concern student perceptions.  
 The EKS Model’s second key concept is scientific knowledge. I hold that 
scientific knowledge of why p is achieved when one’s belief in an explanation of p is 
“safe” because of one’s scientific explanatory evaluation (SEEing). A belief is safe if 
and only if it could not easily have been false given the way it was actually formed 
(Pritchard 2005). This entails that it is true, and provides useful way of unpacking 
how beliefs can be reliably formed. SEEing consists of three stages: (a) considering 
plausible potential explanations of a phenomenon, (b) comparing those explanations 
using the best available scientific methods and evidence, and (c) basing one’s 
(typically doxastic) commitments about those explanations on those comparisons. 
Thus, the claim is that scientific knowledge of an explanation is achieved when 
one’s explanatory commitments could not easily have been false given the way that 
one considered and compared that explanation to plausible alternatives of the same 
phenomenon.  
Ryan et al. engage in SEEing. They consider not only the explanatory factors 
canvassed above (self-efficacy, gender, goal structure, and social-emotional support), 
but also teacher attitudes about their goal and support structure. They not only 
consider individual student perceptions, but also aggregate classroom perceptions of 
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self-efficacy, goal structure, and social-emotional support. This latter point is what 
leads them to adopt HLM rather than standard ordinary least squares analyses, 
since it is better method for comparing individual- and group-level effects.  
Moreover, in their comparisons, they found that some variables—such as 
teacher attitudes and perceptions—make no difference to help avoidance, and also 
find interesting interactions between other variables such as self-efficacy and 
gender. Finally, they draw the appropriate inferences from these different 
comparisons: some variables are taken to be explanatory, while others are not. 
Moreover, Ryan et al.’s SEEing makes their beliefs safe. Statistical methodology is 
largely designed to make sure that the null hypothesis could not easily have been 
true (in which case, the alternative would have been false.)5 
 Thus, as a first run through a social-scientific example, the EKS Model does 
quite well. Educational psychologists appear to believe in an approximately true 
explanation of help avoidance, thus MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING is satisfied. 
Furthermore, in accord with THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE, they do not rest content with a 
single explanation of help avoidance, but seek to grasp multiple explanations 
(involving self-efficacy, gender, and teachers’ emotional supportiveness) and their 
interrelations. Finally, their grasp of these explanations involves safe consideration, 
comparison, and explanatory commitments, which are characteristic of scientific 
 
5 There is much work to be done linking modal epistemology to statistical 
methodology. See Roush (2007), for example. 
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explanatory evaluation (SEEing), just as THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE 
suggests. 
4. Ilongot Headhunting 
Admittedly, Ryan et al.’s is one of the “easier” social-scientific examples for an 
account of scientific understanding, such as my own, to cover. It uses statistics and 
a quasi-experimental design. Nevertheless, it is an intentional-action explanation 
that is readily accommodated by an account of scientific understanding. I’ll now 
apply the EKS Model to an example that seems better-positioned to favor 
interpretivism—an example from cultural anthropology that has no statistics and 
that does not readily lend itself to anything resembling an experimental set-up. The 
EKS Model’s success here should begin to give erstwhile interpretivists greater 
pause. 
The Ilongot are a tribe indigenous to the east side of Luzon, the largest 
island in the Philippines. Most infamously, they are known to engage in 
headhunting. Given that this practice is regarded as so abhorrent and morally 
incomprehensible in many other cultures—especially the Western cultures in which 
most anthropologists are reared—Ilongot headhunting is puzzling. To fill this gap in 
our understanding, Renato Rosaldo (1980) stayed with the Ilongot on two separate 
occasions: from 1967-1969, and again in 1974. During these periods, he conducted 
multiple interviews and engaged in extensive ethnographic observation of the 
Ilongot in order to get a grip on their headhunting practices. 
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 The EKS Model readily captures the understanding that Rosaldo gained. 
Begin with MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING. Rosaldo explains several aspects of Ilongot 
headhunting, though the most fundamental is why Ilongot men take heads. Rosaldo 
explains this phenomenon as follows: headhunting is the culmination of several 
rites of passage that young Ilongot men undergo in their transition to full-blown 
adulthood. Those who have not yet taken a head are called “novices” (siap). Novices 
tend to be envious of those who have taken heads and have thereby “arrived.” The 
latter are marked by curved red hornbill earrings, which garner the admiration of 
young women, and entitle their wearers to retort to taunts from older men. By 
contrast, married novices are taunted, typically with jokes about wanting to behead 
their wives, and are not supposed to answer back. Thus, Ilongot men take heads 
because it is a rite of passage. Moreover, Rosaldo (1980, 140) describes 
headhunting’s symbolic meaning: 
To take a head is, in Ilongot terms, not to capture a trophy, but to ‘throw 
away’ a body part, which by a principle of sympathetic magic represents the 
cathartic throwing away of certain burdens of life—the grudge an insult has 
created, or the grief over death in the family, or the increasing ‘weight’ of 
remaining a novice when one’s peers have left that status. 
Turn now to the four conditions from my thin account of explanation. The first 
condition requires the explanandum to be approximately true, and it is: many 
Ilongot men take heads.6  
 
6 Linguistically speaking, this statement is probably best understood as a generic.  
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Next, consider the explanans. All indications are that Rosaldo takes 
headhunting’s status as a rite of passage and a symbolic unburdening to be genuine 
motivations of why Ilongot men engage in this practice. In other words, this 
explanans appears to be more or less true, which thereby satisfies a reasonable 
ontological commitment.  
Furthermore, while he does not explicitly speak of difference-making, it 
would be natural to interpret him as committed to the counterfactual claim that, 
ceteris paribus, if taking a head were not a rite of passage for Ilongot youths, then, 
in general, Ilongot men would not take heads. Furthermore, it is clear that he is 
seeking cultural causes of Ilongot headhunting, which can be regarded as a local 
constraint. Additionally, he clearly disavows deterministic causation as a local 
constraint (Rosaldo 1980, 152-153). Consequently, all of the requirements of my 
thin account of explanation are satisfied. It is also natural to interpret his writing 
as assertoric. Hence, he appears to believe this explanation. Thus, according to the 
EKS Model, Rosaldo has minimal understanding of why Ilongot men take heads. 
  Turn now to the THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE, which states that understanding 
improves in proportion to the amount of explanatory information grasped. Not only 
does Rosaldo identify the cultural factors that contribute to Ilongot headhunting, 
but he also examines historical-political factors of headhunting, such as feuds 
between different Ilongot groups (betran) (Rosaldo 1980, 61-79) and psychological 
factors that drove individual Ilongot men, such as the ever-volatile Luku, to take 
heads at particular times (Rosaldo 1980, 164-165). These explanations also satisfy 
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the requirements of my thin account of explanation, but, more importantly, having 
all three kinds of explanation—cultural, historical-political, and psychological—
improves our understanding of Ilongot headhunting, as the THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE 
states. Thus, we see yet another way in which the EKS Model readily accounts for 
Rosaldo’s understanding of Ilongot headhunting. 
 The EKS Model’s third and final feature is THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
PRINCIPLE, which holds that understanding improves to the degree that one’s grasp 
of explanatory information resembles scientific knowledge. Recall that scientific 
knowledge of an explanation, in turn, was defined as a belief that is safe because of 
scientific explanatory evaluation (SEEing). Rosaldo exhibits all three of SEEing’s 
aforementioned stages. First, he considers several plausible potential explanations 
of Ilongot headhunting. In addition to the cultural, historical-political, and 
psychological factors just discussed, Rosaldo also considers other explanations, such 
as that historically invariant social structures explain Ilongot headhunting (pp. 26-
27); that the Ilongot testimony he acquired was mendacious (pp. 109-134); and that 
Ilongot men are obligated to take heads (pp. 141-142). 
 The second and third stages of SEEing involves comparing the explanations 
considered and committing oneself to various explanatory claims on the basis of 
those comparisons. The last three candidate explanations were ultimately rejected 
on the respective grounds that: 
• Ilongot headhunting waxed and waned at different periods from 1883-1974, 
and hence could not be the result of an invariant social structure. 
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• Careful investigation of Ilongot testimonial norms across a wide variety of 
domains reveals them to be strongly error-averse: one rarely testifies to 
something that one has not witnessed firsthand. Furthermore, claims about 
headhunting were robust across different testimonial sources. 
• The presence of married novices, plus evidence that the idea that Ilongot 
were obligated to take heads sprung from gossip and Christian propaganda. 
Comparisons need not always involve explanatory competition. Often, comparisons 
reveal interactions or complementarities between explanations.7 Rosaldo does 
precisely this with the cultural, historical-political, and psychological explanations 
that he accepted. For instance, intergenerational feuds between different betran 
leads to a host of psychological burdens. Members of one betran may harm members 
of another, such that the latter’s sons are both saddened and insulted. Headhunting 
is a way for the sons to unburden themselves of these emotions.  
However, whereas the norm appears to be that the taking of nearly any head 
has this cathartic effect, the aforementioned Luku, a member of the Rumyad betran, 
was somewhat unique in passing up the opportunity to take the head of an outsider, 
and insisting instead on taking the head of a member from the rival Butag betran. 
While this was not consonant with Ilongot norms concerning headhunting, Luku 
felt compelled to do so because a member of the Butag had threatened to kill his 
father fifteen years earlier in 1935. When Luku finally took a Butag head in 1950 
 
7 Recall the passing mention of the interaction between gender and self-efficacy in 
the educational psychology example. 
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(and at the same time that elder Rumyads were negotiating a truce with the Butag), 
this reignited the feud between the Rumyad and Butag. Thus, there is a rich 
tapestry of relations between Rosaldo’s cultural, historical- political, and 
psychological explanations. 
 Importantly, the EKS Model urges comparisons between explanations to be 
done on the basis of the best available methods and evidence. Not only does Rosaldo 
use standard ethnographic methods, such as in-depth interviews of multiple Ilongot 
members, but he very explicitly discusses how ethnographers can do historical work 
and apply it in societies, like the Ilongot, who do not have written records of their 
past. To that end, he took special measures to overcome methodological difficulties 
that other anthropologists have raised with respect to inferring historical claims 
from interviews (Rosaldo 1980, 14-28). He also provides a detailed discussion of his 
method of “cohort analysis” (Rosaldo 1980, 110-120) in which groups of similarly-
aged Ilongot were studied longitudinally, in order to transform “the composite 
biography into a collection of individual biographies in their historical, cultural, and 
social structural contexts” (Rosaldo 1980, 110). Cohort analysis was not used widely 
in ethnography, though it was a standard method in the adjacent fields of 
demography, sociology, and social history. 
 Thus, it appears that Rosaldo’s inquiry includes many features of THE 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE. Insofar as anything is absent, it is that he 
makes no explicit references to anything resembling safety, i.e. that his 
explanations could not easily have been false. However, as I argue elsewhere 
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(Khalifa 2017, 48-50, 194-207), unsafe methods and unsafe evidence seem ill-suited 
to scientific practice. Very roughly, it would license rather reckless explanatory 
reasoning. Additionally, unsafe explanatory commitments would render the value of 
understanding somewhat mysterious: why would anyone seek to have explanations 
that easily could have been false? 
 In summary, just as we saw all three features of the EKS Model in full 
display with our example of educational psychology, we see the same in Rosaldo’s 
understanding of Ilongot headhunting. When coupled with its earlier applications to 
the natural sciences, naturalists have license for optimism. Understanding in the 
human sciences does not appear to be different in kind than understanding in the 
natural sciences.  
5. Verstehen as Scientific Understanding 
Of course, these are only two examples. Ideally, detailed case studies would be used 
to settle my recasting of the Verstehen Wars, but one can only do so much in a single 
paper! Nevertheless, I now examine some of the conceptual challenges that 
interpretivists face in resisting my claim that Verstehen is a species of scientific 
understanding.8 
 More precisely, if Verstehen were not a species of scientific understanding, 
then it would have to contravene MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING, THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE, 
or THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE. Furthermore, if interpretivists succeeded 
 
8 Recall that this paper only argues that if one has Verstehen, then one has 
understanding in the manner prescribed by the EKS Model. For the purposes of this 
paper, I remain agnostic as to whether the converse is true. 
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in establishing that one of the EKS Model’s three features is absent from Verstehen, 
they would also have to show that this same feature is present in understanding 
found throughout the natural sciences. Otherwise, interpretivists will only have 
shown that the EKS Model imposes unnecessary constraints on both Verstehen and 
scientific understanding, which would not get interpretivists their desired 
bifurcation. Call this the Distinction Test. 
 In what follows, Sections 5.1 through 5.3 argues that interpretivists’ 
prospects of forgoing the EKS Model’s strictures while passing the Distinction Test 
appear bleak. Section 5.4 concludes this section by arguing that the EKS Model 
imposes stronger necessary conditions on scientific understanding than other extant 
proposals, and thereby makes it easier for interpretivists to pass the Distinction 
Test than other proposals in the new literature on understanding. Hence, 
interpretivists face far steeper dialectical burdens in arguing for the claim that 
Verstehen is not a kind of scientific understanding than has been countenanced. 
 
5.1. Verstehen without Minimal Understanding? 
Recall my account of MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING:  
Minimal understanding of why p is having an approximately true belief in an 
explanation of p. 
As I see it, interpretivists can deny this in one of two ways. First, they can deny 
that Verstehen requires approximate truth. Second, they can deny that Verstehen 
requires explanation.  
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 Denying that Verstehen traffics in approximate truth seems curious. After all, 
the goal of Verstehen appears to be an accurate depiction of another person’s mental 
life. Furthermore, the hedge—that the explanation be approximately true—is meant 
to dispel utopian demands for top-shelf fidelity to every detail of another’s inner 
workings. So, the basic picture is that one must get something about another’s 
perspective more or less right in order to understand. Interpretivists would have to 
find social-scientific examples that forgo this basic requirement in order to show 
that Verstehen need not be approximately true. This is no small feat. 
Our examples certainly provide no indication that this is the case. Suppose, 
for instance, that self-efficacy, gender, and student perceptions classroom goal 
structure and of their teachers’ emotional supportiveness did not explain patterns of 
help avoidance, or that headhunting’s status as a rite of passage did not explain its 
prevalence among Ilongot men. In such cases, one might reasonably worry that our 
inquirers have misunderstood help avoidance or Ilongot headhunting. Moreover, 
this does not appear to be peculiar to these sorts of examples. 
A more promising way of challenging Verstehen’s veridicality would be to 
embed it in a kind of antirealism. Perhaps competent interpreters need not believe 
that propositional attitudes and mental representations exist, but they nevertheless 
use them for predicting and explaining others’ actions. However, it is hard to see 
how this will pass the Distinction Test. After all, some have suggested precisely the 
same stance be adopted toward theoretical entities in the natural sciences (van 
Fraassen 1980). Indeed, as we have seen, my thin account of explanation is 
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amenable to explanation having more relaxed ontological requirements than 
scientific realists require.9 
 If interpretivists cannot overcome these obstacles to denying MINIMAL 
UNDERSTANDING’S requirement of approximate truth, then perhaps they would be 
better served to deny that Verstehen requires explanation. This claim, of course, has 
a much longer history in the Verstehen Wars, for Verstehen was frequently 
contrasted with Erklären, i.e., explanation. However, such arguments have been 
repeatedly thwarted on the grounds that they caricature explanations in the 
natural sciences. For instance, while Erklären-qua-interpretivist-bogeyman has, at 
various points, required laws and causation, it’s highly doubtful that the life 
sciences traffic in the nomological (Woodward 2001, Mitchell 1997) and there has 
been a profusion of philosophical discussions about noncausal explanations 
throughout the natural sciences (Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018).  
The EKS Model is chastened by these and other developments, and thus 
imposes more modest requirements on explanation than interpretivists have 
considered. Indeed, its most distinctive requirement—that the explanans make a 
difference to the explanandum—is one that I have, in subsequent work, questioned 
as a universal constraint on all explanations (Khalifa, Doble, and Millson 
forthcoming). All of this makes interpretivist attempts to pass the Distinction Test 
unpromising. 
 
9 Khalifa (2017, Ch. 6) discusses scientific understanding’s relationship to truth, 
including its antirealist variants, in greater detail. 
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 Let me consider two more avenues for divorcing Verstehen from explanation. 
First, recall that on my account of explanation, the explanandum must be 
approximately true. Our examples seem to accord with this basic idea: certain 
students avoid seeking help and the Ilongot take heads. However, one might argue 
that Verstehen requires a special kind of interpretation of the phenomenon to be 
understood. 
Unfortunately for interpretivists, it’s unclear how this challenges MINIMAL 
UNDERSTANDING. Such interpretations would have to issue profoundly false 
descriptions of the phenomenon and obviate the need for explanation. To my 
knowledge, this argument has not been made. Moreover, philosophers of natural 
science working on measurement have recently availed themselves to 
hermeneutical resources (van Fraassen 2008, Cupples ms), which suggests that this 
proposal will fail the Distinction Test. 
Second, interpretivists might profit by borrowing a concept from recent work 
on understanding. Thus far, we have focused on understanding why, or explanatory 
understanding. This is frequently contrasted with objectual understanding (Elgin 
2017, Kvanvig 2003, Carter and Gordon 2014, Baumberger and Brun 2017, Dellsén 
, Kelp 2015). The clearest difference between explanatory and objectual 
understanding occurs at the level of grammar. Paradigmatic expressions of 
explanatory understanding have embedded explanation-seeking questions as their 
complements, e.g. Rosaldo understands why the Ilongot take heads. In contrast, 
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objectual understanding takes noun phrases as its complement, e.g. Rosaldo 
understands Ilongot headhunting.  
Objectual understanding is generally thought to be achievable without 
explanation. For instance, simply being able to situate a phenomenon in a broader 
inferential framework might garner some degree of objectual understanding.10 
Moreover, thinking of Verstehen as a kind of objectual understanding is highly 
suggestive, for interpreters seem to seek understanding of people and not simply 
understanding of why those people do and think various things.  
However, such a strategy is not without its difficulties. Those who have 
defended objectual understanding make no special allowance for the human 
sciences, so interpretivists run the risk of flunking the Distinction Test. 
Furthermore, arguments for a kind of objectual understanding that swings 
completely free of explanatory understanding are not without their liabilities. In 
particular, I have argued that nothing of philosophical importance is lost if all 
instances of objectual understanding are treated as one or more instances of: 
(a) explanatory understanding, or 
(b) being on the right track to having explanatory understanding (Khalifa 
2017, Ch. 4). 
 
10 Since I’m focused on challenges to the necessity of the EKS Model, I bracket 
claims about whether objectual understanding sometimes requires more than 
explanatory understanding. See Khalifa (2017, Ch. 4) for my full treatment of 
objectual understanding.  
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Consider the claim, “Rosaldo understands Ilongot headhunting.” My view correctly 
predicts that Rosaldo has many approximately true beliefs that correctly answer 
different why-questions about Ilongot headhunting. For instance, he can explain 
why the Ilongot take heads, why Ilongot headhunting escalated from 1950-1952, 
etc.  
However, in other regards, much of his ethnography appears “merely 
descriptive.” For example, he discusses Ilongots’ language for remembering past 
events. This is where condition (b) enters the scene: despite not providing an 
explanation, and thereby not providing understanding why, this ethnographic 
information nevertheless plays an explanatory role that puts one on the right track 
to further explanatory understanding of some facet of Ilongot headhunting.  
Specifically, if this kind of “proto-understanding” were not countenanced, then it 
becomes increasingly difficult to account for why some descriptions about a subject 
do not appear to enhance our understanding. For instance, why is Rosaldo’s 
description of Ilongot ways of describing the past illuminating of their headhunting 
practice while the true statement, “Either Ilongot take heads or unicorns exist,” is 
not? A plausible answer is that only the former can play an explanatory role, and 
thus puts inquirers on the right track to explanatory understanding. Specifically, 
because Rosaldo is using Ilongot testimony to determine why different periods of 
their history had varying levels of headhunting, it is important that he have an 
accurate way of inferring historical claims from their testimony. In this way, claims 
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about their descriptions of the past play an explanatory role as evidence that can be 
used for confirming explanations about historical patterns of headhunting. 
Thus, we have seen that interpretivists face formidable challenges in denying 
the EKS Model’s account of minimal understanding, which requires approximately 
true beliefs in explanations. To deny that Verstehen must be approximately true 
seems to either to contravene an obvious aim of the human sciences (getting 
another person’s mental life right) or to collapse interpretivism into a non-distinct 
kind of scientific antirealism. To deny that Verstehen traffics in explanation fails to 
respect the diversity of explanations in the natural sciences or requires unpacking 
the rather mercurial concept of objectual understanding. In principle, these 
challenges are surmountable, but they are far from trivial, either. 
 
5.2. Can Verstehen Bypass the Explanatory Nexus? 
If Verstehen and scientific understanding are both committed to MINIMAL 
UNDERSTANDING, then, in the present context, interpretivists will have to argue that 
Verstehen does not improve in accordance with the EKS Model’s two remaining 
features. Recall that the EKS Model’s first norm for improving understanding is 
THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE:  
Understanding of why p improves in proportion to the amount explanatory 
information about p that is grasped. 
We can see the amount of explanatory information as a function of three things: 
• The number of correct explanations and inter-explanatory relations grasped 
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• The quality/importance of the explanations and inter-explanatory relations 
grasped 
• The level of detail of the explanations and inter-explanatory relations 
grasped (Khalifa 2017, 10) 
Thus, interpretivists should find examples in which social scientists are confronted 
with two or more accounts of the same phenomenon, and opt for one that is strictly 
dominated along these three dimensions. Ideally, the social scientists would provide 
compelling methodological reasons for their choice. 
 Having laid out the burden of proof, I must profess ignorance as to whether 
social-scientific practice will favor interpretivists or naturalists. However, let me 
offer two motivations for tethering Verstehen to THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE. First, THE 
NEXUS PRINCIPLE easily piggybacks on the preceding arguments for MINIMAL 
UNDERSTANDING. The basic idea is this: because MINIMAL UNDERSTANDING entails 
that one gets some understanding by getting a little bit of explanatory information, 
it’s natural to think that one gets more understanding with more explanatory 
information—but this is precisely what THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE counsels. 
 Insofar as there may be room for claiming that Verstehen does not improve in 
proportion to explanatory information, it is that certain kinds of explanatory 
information do not seem to enhance Verstehen. For instance, suppose that Rosaldo’s 
ethnographic work could be integrated with findings in cognitive neuroscience. One 
might argue that this enhances our scientific understanding, but not our Verstehen, 
of Ilongot headhunting. However, it is hard to see how this line of argument will 
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pass the Distinction Test. For instance, just as our hypothetical anthropologists can 
safely ignore neuroscientific factors that affect Ilongot headhunting, physicists 
working in classical regimes can often safely ignore quantum-mechanical and 
relativistic explanatory factors. To put this another way, this just seems to conflate 
the fact that inquirers of all persuasions sometimes favor the quality or relevance of 
explanatory information over its sheer quantity. 
 To summarize, interpretivists could bolster their case by showing that 
interpreters sometimes leave explanatory information on the table in favor of 
something more Verstehen-esque. The jury is still out on that. However, even if such 
an example is found, it will have to dissolve the tight link between MINIMAL 
UNDERSTANDING and THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE (perhaps by undercutting motivations 
for the former), and will have to show that forgoing THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE is not an 
instance of the everyday scientific practice of focusing on some explanatory factors 
while downplaying others. 
 
5.3. Does Verstehen Resemble Scientific Knowledge? 
Recall THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE:  
Understanding of why p improves in proportion to the resemblance of this 
grasp to scientific knowledge of why p. 
Furthermore, scientific knowledge of an explanation was characterized as a safe 
belief in an explanation that is because of SEEing. We can see resemblance to this 
knowledge as having several dimensions: 
 28 
• The number of plausible potential explanations that the agent has considered 
• The number of considered explanations that the agent has compared using 
scientifically acceptable methods and evidence 
• The scientific status of the methods and evidence that the agent used to 
compare the explanations 
• The safety of the agent’s beliefs about explanations 
• The accuracy of the agent’s beliefs about explanations 
• The variety of ways that the agent can use explanatory information so as to 
achieve different scientific goals (Khalifa 2017, 13-14) 
As with THE NEXUS PRINCIPLE, if interpretivists wish to challenge THE SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE as a norm governing Verstehen, they should find examples 
in which social scientists are confronted with two or more accounts of the same 
phenomenon, and opt for one that is strictly dominated along these six dimensions. 
Ideally, the social scientists would provide compelling methodological reasons for 
their choice. 
 Having presented this burden of proof, I must once again profess ignorance 
as to whether social-scientific practice will favor interpretivists or naturalists. 
However, as before, I think that there are reasons to link Verstehen to THE 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE. First, this principle helps to mitigate certain 
kinds of underdetermination. Here, I have no fancy, philosophical 
underdetermination in mind, but the workaday underdetermination that scientists 
encounter when they puzzle over whether something else is actually explaining the 
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phenomena of interest, agonize over potential confounds, etc. This kind of 
underdetermination appears especially prevalent in sciences where Verstehen is 
most at home. After all, these human sciences rarely feature controlled or replicable 
experimentation. Thus, if interpretivists deny that Verstehen is subject to THE 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE, they face a further burden of proof. Either they 
must show that the human sciences rule out just-so stories through some other 
structure than SEEing, or else they must show that just-so stories are on a 
methodological par with explanations that accurately depict the structure of human 
action. These additional burdens of proof are nontrivial. 
 Second, the Distinction Test looms large once again. The EKS Model grants 
that different sciences will have different methods and different evidence for 
comparing explanations. For instance, what do particle colliders and bacterial 
cultures have in common? Why treat different kinds of statistical tests, much less 
non-statistical tests, as of a single kind? In short, the EKS Model is compatible with 
science exhibiting a substantial “disunity of method” (Wylie 1999). Hence, 
interpretivists must show that there is something common to all natural-scientific 
methods of explanatory comparison that is absent in the human sciences. 
 
5.4. The Distinction Test: Further Reflections 
I have noted that if Verstehen is discordant with the EKS Model, this does not 
automatically vindicate interpretivism. In particular, if Verstehen and some natural 
sciences diverge from the EKS Model in the same way, then the proper response is 
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not to embrace interpretivism, but to reject the EKS Model. That is the crux of the 
Distinction Test. I conclude my discussion by pointing out that the EKS Model is 
among the more demanding accounts of scientific understanding.11 Hence, 
interpretivists’ prospects of passing the Distinction Test are not altogether bright. 
Roughly, we can see two sorts of constraints on natural-scientific 
understanding in the literature: ability-based and coherentist. I will show that the 
EKS Model provides the most demanding versions of these constraints. I stress that 
what matters for the purposes at hand is demandingness, not plausibility (though of 
course I have my biases on this latter issue as well!) 
Consider those who hold that understanding largely consists of fitting a 
phenomenon into a coherent system of beliefs (Elgin 2017, Carter and Gordon 2014, 
Riggs 2009, Kvanvig 2003). It is unsurprising that this kind of understanding is 
common to the natural and social sciences. With rare exception, scientists aim to fit 
their explanation with their other theoretical and empirical commitments. 
Unsurprisingly, then, few coherence-based constraints on understanding are even 
pitched as dividing lines between natural- and social-scientific understanding. 
Indeed, Elgin (2017) provides the most developed coherentist-based account and 
highlights several commonalities between scientific, humanistic, and artistic 
understanding. 
 
11 Space being limited, these comparisons will have to be somewhat cursory. See 
references for closer comparisons that I’ve made elsewhere. 
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More directly, the EKS Model also countenances typical coherence-making 
relationships, e.g. logical, probabilistic, and explanatory relationships between 
propositions. However, these relationships only provide understanding insofar as 
they figure in SEEing. No other coherence-based constraints on understanding 
require this, and instead are fairly underspecified about the cognitive processes that 
yielded these coherence-making relationships. Hence, the EKS Model is more 
demanding than these coherentist approaches.12 
 Turn now to ability-based constraints, which claim that understanding is 
only achieved when certain abilities are exercised. They are more varied than 
coherentist approaches, and so require more extensive discussion. The EKS Model’s 
trademark abilities are those characterizing SEEing: consideration, comparison, 
and the inferences required to go from explanatory comparisons to explanatory 
commitments. Additionally, one must have the requisite abilities to wield the 
EXPLAINS concept, i.e. one must be able to explain.  
Thus, views which only require understanders to be able to explain (Greco 
2013, Pritchard 2014) will be less demanding than the EKS Model, since they will 
not have any rider about SEEing. Some views attempt to specify this explanatory 
ability in greater detail, typically by adding that understanders must be able to 
engage in counterfactual reasoning of some sort (Hills 2015, Grimm 2014). 
However, this is also required by the EKS Model, for counterfactual reasoning 
 
12 For more extensive discussions about the differences between the EKS Model and 
coherentist approaches, see Khalifa (2016, 2017, Ch. 4). 
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appears to be essential for showing how an explanans makes a difference to its 
explanandum. Since these views also place no constraints on how that explanation 
is acquired, while the EKS Model specifies SEEing as the preferred pathway to 
explanatory knowledge, it is also more demanding than these views.13 
Wilkenfeld’s (2013) view requires understanders to be able to manipulate 
representations in a manner that enables them to perform a context-relevant task. 
While the EKS Model is not couched in the language of representation-
manipulation, the counterfactual reasoning just discussed would seem to qualify as 
an instance on Wilkenfeld’s standards. So, the question is whether fulfilling a 
context-specific task makes Wilkenfeld’s view more or less demanding than the EKS 
Model. Once again, the preferred vocabularies of the views do not readily line up, 
but I think that the following is fair. According to the EKS Model, one context-
invariant task is that of having SEEn oneself to a correct answer to a why-question. 
Wilkenfeld does not even require that one answer a why-question. Thus, the EKS 
Model is more demanding than Wilkenfeld’s account. 
Like Wilkenfeld, De Regt (2017) leaves ample room for context-sensitivity, 
but like the EKS Model, de Regt takes all understanding to require a correct 
explanation. Rather than focusing on tasks, de Regt focusing on which skills the 
scientists have for using the available theoretical resources. It’s somewhat unclear 
where the EKS Model and de Regt’s approach diverge.14 However, for the purposes 
 
13 For more detailed critiques of these positions, see Khalifa (2017, Ch. 3)  
14 For further discussion, see Khalifa (2017, Ch. 2 and Ch. 6), Khalifa and Gadomski 
(2013). 
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of the present paper, the EKS Model is to be preferred for providing a more precise 
account of the relationship between warrant and understanding. 
Finally, let’s examine Newman’s (2012, 2013) inferential model of 
understanding. On this view, understanding requires: (1) knowledge that q explains 
why p, plus (2) an ability to provide further inferentially articulated knowledge of 
the causal, logical, or probabilistic reasons about how q explains why p. On the one 
hand, Newman’s view does not require understanding to involve SEEing. So, in this 
regard, the EKS Model is more demanding than the inferential model. On the other 
hand, Newman’s account of understanding may appear more demanding in 
requiring inferential knowledge betwixt explanans and explanandum.  
This is somewhat complicated. The EKS Model claims that understanding 
improves in proportion to the amount explanatory information grasped. The 
inferential model’s two conditions might then reflect two different but related pieces 
of explanatory information: (1) the information required to answer why p? and (2) 
the information required to answer how does q explain (cause, etc.) p? Importantly, 
the EKS Model claims that it is possible to understand why p via an explanation q 
without knowing how q brings p about. Newman’s view does not tolerate this 
possibility. So, in this regard, Newman’s view is more demanding than the EKS 
Model. However, the EKS Model does claim that a person who grasped both (1) and 
(2) would understand why p better than a person who only grasped (1). 
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Furthermore, it’s unclear that this particular difference between our views has 
much of a bearing on the Verstehen wars.15 
Thus, all told, the EKS Model appears more demanding than the other 
accounts of scientific understanding that have been proposed in the last decade or 
so. As a result, even if interpretivists can effectively argue that Verstehen does not 
conform to the EKS Model, there are half a dozen other accounts of scientific 
understanding with laxer requirements that it must also resist in order to pass the 
Distinction Test. Once again, we see that interpretivists face substantial burdens of 
proof once they engage with this new literature on understanding. 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that philosophers of social science can profit by engaging with recent 
literature in epistemology and the philosophy of science on the topic of 
understanding. Using examples from different social sciences, I have argued that 
my own contributions to the latter literature—primarily in the form of the EKS 
Model—can be extended to the social sciences. This has implications for the 
Verstehen Wars, and, in particular, favors the idea that Verstehen is a species of 
scientific understanding. Furthermore, I have considered some possible 
interpretivist rebuttals to this claim, and rehearsed some of the hurdles that such 
rebuttals face.  
 However, the preceding is more in the spirit of an invitation to carry on a new 
conversation than it is a shot across the interpretivist bow. I welcome 
 
15 For further comparison between my view and Newman’s, see Khalifa (2015). 
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interpretivists to discharge some of the burdens of proof I have presented. 
Additionally, I have been silent as to whether the EKS Model imposes sufficient 
conditions on Verstehen. I conclude by briefly pointing to two issues on this front 
that deserve further discussion going forward. 
 First, the EKS Model is highly attuned to the differences between sciences. 
Different explanations will have different local constraints. Different explanatory 
evaluations will require different methods and different kinds of evidence. All of 
these differences occur between different natural sciences just as much as they 
occur between the natural sciences and the human sciences. So, for interpretivists 
seeking to establish that Verstehen requires more than scientific understanding, a 
key question will be whether this “something extra” isn’t just a variation on one of 
these themes. 
Second, no two scientific fields are identical, so there will always be 
differences. Presumably, interpretivists intend for the differences between 
Verstehen and scientific understanding to be deeper than the differences between, 
say, understanding in physics and chemistry. But then when do these differences 
become “deep enough” for interpretivists to declare victory in the Verstehen Wars?16 
I suspect that this might be the key to settling the Verstehen Wars once and for all. 
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